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Abstract—Since the early 1960, industrial process control has
been applied by electric systems. In the mid 1970’s, the term
SCADA emerged, describing the automated control and data
acquisition. Since most industrial and automation networks were
physically isolated, security was not an issue. This changed,
when in the early 2000’s industrial networks were opened
to the public internet. The reasons were manifold. Increased
interconnectivity led to more productivity, simplicity and ease
of use. It decreased the configuration overhead and downtimes
for system adjustments. However, it also led to an abundance of
new attack vectors. In recent time, there has been a remarkable
amount of attacks on industrial companies and infrastructures.
In this paper, known attacks on industrial systems are analysed.
This is done by investigating the exploits that are available on
public sources. The different types of attacks and their points of
entry are reviewed in this paper. Trends in exploitation as well
as targeted attack campaigns against industrial enterprises are
introduced.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1970’s, the third industrial revolution took place [1].
During this phase, computers were introduced into industry
in order to automate tasks that, until then, had to be done
by hand or by application-tailored solutions. Since then, the
computer technology has taken huge steps. Reconfigurable
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) took the place of
hard-wired relay logic circuits [2]. Domain-specific, propri-
etary fieldbuses, like CAN [3] and Modbus [4], [5], have been
replaced by TCP/IP-based solutions, such as ModbusTCP [5],
[6], ProfiNET [7] and OPC UA [8], that make use of the vastly
available internet infrastructure and its network hardware.
Opening networks to the outside enables easier management
of production capabilities. Remote maintenance, simpler ad-
justment of machines and a constant flow of information
are but a few of the advantages. There are, however, some
downsides. Two of the main reasons why security is inherently
absent in virtually every technology and protocol used, are as
follows: Industrial networks were physically separated from
the internet, when the technology arose [9] and each set up of
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an industrial company is unique and very hard to get around
in [9]. As recent events, many of which are explained in
section V, show, both assertions do not hold true anymore,
if they ever did. Many recent examples show that industrial
networks can and will be breached. It needs to be highlighted,
that, as in consumer electronics, the user plays a crucial
role in securing a system. Many of the newer botnets, such
as Hajime or Mirai, try to gain access by using default
credentials, with a tremendous success. This behaviour has
been analysed, among others, in our previous works [10], [11].
Many industrial systems use credentials for means of config-
uration. For reasons of ease of use, however, the passwords
are often weak and shared among many users. Attackers that
try standard configurations to gain access will succeed if the
system credentials have not been altered. This kind of threat
is also common in the exploits examined in section IV. It is
very hard for intrusion detection systems to discover abuse
that is performed with valid credentials. Changing default
credentials is therefore a vital step in order to enable security in
a system. The remainder of this work is structured as follows.
In section II, surveys and analyses of attacks are listed. After
that, a statistical analysis of the Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) list is performed in section III. This is
followed by an in-depth analysis of available Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)-system based exploits
in section IV, as well as a breakdown of attack campaigns
against industry in section V. The lessons learned are listed
in section VI. This work will be concluded in section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Even though there are a lot of survey papers, as well
as taxonomies that present an overview of different kinds
of attacks, there has not yet been a systematic analysis of
all publicly available SCADA exploits to the best of our
knowledge. A very broad and extensive overview over current
SCADA-based attack-vectors can be found in the works of
Zhu, Joseph and Sastry [12]. In addition to that, there are
other works that give an overview over existing SCADA-
attacks and survey current exploits [9], [13], [14], [15]. Not
only attacks on SCADA-systems are well documented, but also
countermeasures, as well as means for hardening systems, are
processed in literature [16], [17]. There are also works pre-
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senting taxonomies of attacks, also in order to help operators
assess risks and threats to their systems and implement the
according countermeasures [18], [19], as well as works for the
collection of data that allows for insight about the condition of
a system [20], [21]. The German Federal Office for Informa-
tion Security (BSI) periodically releases security advices for
industry [22]. Furthermore, there are surveys analysing specific
domains, such as automotive and fieldbus-security [23] (some
of the relevant works are in German [24], [25]) and wireless-
security [26]. Many of the exploits we examine in this paper
have already been investigated in literature. The amount of
works analysing singular attacks is vast, therefore, we only
reference such works in the according sections.
III. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
An exhaustive list of all CVEs can be found online [27].
Since it contains over 100 000 entries, manual analysis was
infeasible. We developed a text-processing script in order to
gain statistical information about the distribution of exploits.
A major drawback was that the most specific information was
written in natural language, without any form. We searched
the document for keywords while using stemming in order
to find any variant of the keyword. Stemming is a technique
employed to process natural languages [28]. The word stems
of keywords are derived, then similar word stems are searched
in the target file. We used the python stemming-library [29].
The results of the statistical analysis are summarised in table I.
The entry ”Overall categorized entries”, as well as the
”Percentage covered by keywords”, display the number of
different attacks that have been classified, after accounting for
entries with multiple keywords. That means 65 919 entries (or
61.87%) in the CVE list can be attributed to at least one of the
categories. The largest group is Remote Code Execution with
28 000 occurrences, closely followed by Denial of Service
(DoS) and Injection attacks. SCADA exploits are relatively
small, with only 373 entries. This shows that, even though
it is not as present as office IT-based attacks, SCADA-based
exploits are becoming more of an issue for manufacturers.
IV. IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS
In this section, four different types of attacks that are
relevant for industrial applications are analysed. First, attacks
on PLC systems are considered in subsection IV-A. After that,
fieldbus-based exploits are discussed in subsection IV-B, fol-
lowed by wireless- and hardware-attacks in subsections IV-C
and IV-D. These types of attacks were chosen to be discussed
as they are the industrial-specific attack vectors and have
not be discussed at large in the context of office-IT-security.
PLCs can mostly be found in industrial environments as they
are used to control production machines. The same goes for
fieldbus systems, that, aside from some appliances in home
automation, are comonly employed in industrial automation.
Wireless networks are also commonly used in office and home
environments. There are, however, industry specific protocols
that are only applied in this context. These protocols are
discussed here. Hardware attacks can have a great impact due
to the distributed nature of production environment and the
fact that machines have hardware interfaces.
A. Attacks on PLCs
PLCs are resource for industrial applications controlling
Cyber-Physical (Production) Systems. Hence, they interact
with and operate devices in the physical world. In contrast to
office IT systems which only handle data, they interact with
the real world. Attacks on PLCs therefore have an impact on
physical entites, be it human workers or production resources.
This leads to grave consequences of the successful abuse
of PLCs. As common computation resources, PLCs usually
require an underlying operating system. In most cases, this
is a version of Windows, adapted to the specific needs for
industrial applications. As there is an abundance of exploits
and vulnerabilites based on flaws in the operating system,
we only consider vulnerabilities that specifically derive from
the industrial application of the given system. Furthermore,
only threats that occur in this context are analysed. In total,
we found about 100 exploits as metasploit [30] modules and
Proofs of Concepts (PoC). All metasploit-modules are listed in
the Rapid7-database [31]. The databases we searched addition-
ally were exploit-db [32], 0day-today [33] and packetstorm-
security [34]. This number is smaller than the entries found
in the CVE list in section III as there is executable code to be
found. As a result, anybody can exploit these vulnerabilities
without much difficulties, rendering them very dangerous
for operators. The number of CVE discoveries and exploit
developments per year is shown in figure 1. Unfortunately,
some exploits could not be attributed to a year; this has been
accounted for by a question mark. The list amounts to a mean
value of 8.8 and a median of 7 exploit developments per year.
A peak of 31 developments per year can be found in 2011. One
possible explanation is that it was the year after Stuxnet [35]
was discovered (see table II) and there was a special interest
in PLC-exploitation. The trend of CVE-development is also
rising, meaning that the amount of CVEs discovered per year
has been rising, starting in 2011.
Fig. 1. Number of Exploit and CVE Discoveries per Year
We distinguished between four different categories of ex-
ploits:
• Code Execution is the unauthorised execution of mali-
cious code
TABLE I
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CVE-LIBRARY
Description Keywords Number Percentage
All CVEs - 106 540 100.00%
Remote Code Execution rce, arbitrary, execution 28 016 26.30%
Denial of Service denial, crash, instable, consume 19 638 18.43%
Injection attacks injection, sql 17 280 16.22%
Information Disclosure traverse, disclose, sensitive, bypass 14 875 13.96%
Buffer Overflows buffer, overflow 9 800 9.20%
SCADA-attacks scada, plc, industry, modbus, profinet, beckhoff, siemens 373 0.35%
Overall categorized entries - 65 919 61.87%
Entries w/ multiple keywords - 21 620 20.29%
• Data Extraction is the unauthorised disclosure of infor-
mation
• DoS describes the partial or full degradation of the
availability of a service or resource
• Privilege Escalation is the process of maliciously obtain-
ing higher privileges on a system than intended
The distribution of these categories on windows-based sys-
tems is depicted in figure 2. Of 66 windows-based exploits,
almost three quarters allow the execution of arbitrary code.
This is a tremendous threat since it allows an attacker to alter,
add and delete resources on the affected system.
Fig. 2. Distribution of Categories on Windows Platforms
Fig. 3. Distribution of Categories for Local Exploits
Furthermore, we grouped all exploits into remote and local.
Local exploits allow an attacker to execute an exploit on a
Fig. 4. Distribution of Categories for Remote Exploits
system he already has unprivileged access to, usually in the
form of a user account with limited rights. Remote exploits
can be executed without any prior access to the system,
despite some form of network connection. In figure 3, the
distribution of the categories for local access is shown. The
overall number of local exploits is relatively small, comprising
only 12 exploits. In this scenario, the execution of code is most
common. The distribution of the categories for remote access
is shown in figure 4. It comprises of 84 exploits, most of
which are code execution as well. The most prevalent threat
for PLC-based exploitation is the execution of remote code.
This is a very severe threat because of the priorities of industry.
While in classic office-IT, the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity,
Availability) security targets are common, each with about the
same importance, the most important security target by far
for industry is availability. Unavailable production facilities
cost a huge amount of money, making this the top priority of
machine operators. Code Execution has the potential to disable
facilities, rendering them unavailable and costing revenue.
B. Attacks on Fieldbus-Level
Due to the proprietary nature of industrial networks, a vast
landscape of fieldbus protocols has emerged. Protocols such as
Modbus [4], Profinet [7], CAN [3], Local Interconnect Network
(LIN) [36], Media Oriented System Transport (MOST) [37] and
FlexRay [38]. These protocols have inherent security flaws.
Since there are no means of authentication, identities are
not assigned to the participating entities [12]. That means
an attacker with access to the bus can appear as a valid
communication partner and thus extract and inject messages.
This results in a break of confidentiality and integrity. Due
to these security flaws and the lack of encryption [39], an
attacker can monitor the systems and even deploy attacks.
Examples for such attacks are Man in the Middle (MitM) and
DoS. In systems using Modbus, malicious adversaries can read
all messages to discover active controllers and used function
codes as well as inject commands themselves. Additionally,
they can send incorrect messages or error flags to eliminate
single controllers or even the entire system. Many industrial
systems have a remote maintenance interface that can be
accessed via internet [14]. Often, this interface is secured
poorly, or not at all [14]. This means that an attacker with
access to the same network as the interface can change system
settings and read system conditions. Gateways are used in
order to connect several fieldbus networks. Oftentimes, these
gateways are not configured securely, allowing an attacker that
has access to one fieldbus network, to traverse to different
networks [24]. As a counter example, OPC-UA [8] needs to
be mentioned. It is a very modern fieldbus-protocol that allows
definition of entities, including authentication and encryption.
The shell model allows for encapsulation of functional units
and the definition of interfaces.
C. Attacks on Wireless Systems
Driven by the fourth industrial revolution, wireless commu-
nication finds its way into industrial systems. There are some
protocols that are commonly used in industrial applications,
such as Bluetooth Low Energy [40], ZigBee [41] and Z-
Wave [42], Radio Frequency IDentifier (RFID) [43] and the
Long Range Wide Area Network (LoRa) [44]. Wireless Local
Area Network (WLAN) [45] is also often used in industry, but
since it was originally developed for classical office-IT, it is not
considered in this work. RFID is commonly used by industry
to tag entities and materials and account for them in storage
or production. The other protocols are commonly used for
data transmission and communication. There are several flaws
and fixes for WLAN, but they are out of scope for this work
for the reasons named above. As there is no physical access
control to the wireless channel, an adversary can listen to the
communication, given he is within the range of the wireless
signal. Therefore, most wireless communication protocols are
encrypted. Still, some encryption schemes can be broken,
rendering the content unprotected. If there is no, or weak,
encryption, an attacker can listen to the communication and
extract information to perform a MitM [46] attack. Further-
more, he can inject messages into the network with the purpose
of launching DoS attacks. A famous example is Wireless
Equivalent Privacy (WEP) [47], that is broken [48] but still in
use. Another example is ZigBee whose encryption key, in its
default configuration, can easily be recovered by an attacker.
Due to poor manufacturer implementations, the secret key is
often transmitted in plain text if a new device advertises to
the network, for example after restarting [49]. An attacker can
obtain this key and gains full access to the network. Another
problem in wireless networks are relay attacks. Using those, an
attacker can capture a communication packet, transport it over
a different protocol, and inject it into the network on a different
place. This is commonly done with Bluetooth or RFID. An
attacker can use this method to get a response to a challenge,
even though the key is not near a key reader. This method has
already successfully been applied to break the Passive Keyless
Entry and Start (PKES) of different car manufacturers [50].
Spoofing and impersonation are other common attack concepts
on wireless protocols. Spoofing means the disguise of an
attacker as a valid entity to participate in a communication,
impersonation describes an attacker that claims to be an entity
she is not. Bluetooth is vulnerable to attacks with Rogue
Access Points (APs) [26], among others. Those are APs that
are set up by an attacker and imitate valid APs. Because
of the ad-hoc nature and the frequency hopping properties
of Bluetooth, rogue APs are hard to detect [26]. The same
concept can be applied to RFID, where fake tags or readers
can read or manipulate entries [51]. Furthermore, wireless
channels are inherently prone to jamming attacks. Since there
is no access control, an attacker can flood the channel with
packets, or simply jam it with noise [52]. This prevents the
valid users from communicating with each other. There are
also more sophisticated approaches that exploit protocol flaws
to prevent communication or that do not jam constantly to
make discovery harder [52].
D. Physical-Layer Attacks
Physical, or hardware attacks, are among the most dif-
ficult ones. An adversary with physical access to a device
or system has more possibilities of inflicting damage and
abusing services than one on a remote location. Industrial
companies, therefore, put a strong emphasis on obstruction of
physical access by perimeters such as, walls, gates and guards.
Given access, an adversary can, with enough force, always
destroy a system rendering it unusable and creating a DoS.
There are, however, more sophisticated and subtle approaches
in tampering with devices. There are attacks on embedded
devices, particularly PLCs, that falsify sensor values. This,
in turn, creates, inapt reactions from the devices, leading to
undesired behaviour. In literature, there is the ”Ghost in the
PLC”-attack, that alters the input-pins of a PLC, as described
by Abbasi and Hashemi [53]. Another work on falsifying input
values and creating improper responses from the system is
shown by Urbina, Giraldo, Tippenhauer and Cardenas [54]. In
addition to tampering with sensor-values, an attacker can read
or update the code on a PLC. Such an attack is described by
Basnight, Butts, Lopez and Dube [55]. In order to stealthily
deploy malware on a PLC, Garcia, Brasser, Cintuglu, Sadeghi,
Mohammed and Zonouz propose a method to read system
information and create a fitting rootkit [56]. Even though it
is not the most relevant attack vector in practice, securing
physical access is a vital task for industry, since adversaries
with direct access have many opportunities with a potentially
high impact.
V. ATTACK CAMPAIGNS
The exploits that have been introduced in section IV have
been used for attack campaigns against industrial players. We
found that there were two noteworthy kinds of attacks:
• Spearphishing campaigns against employees
• Attacks on the industrial infrastructure
Phishing and spearphishing are common practices for mali-
cious adversaries intending to gain insight on company secrets
by gaining access to the office IT infrastructure and stealing
data. A timeline of known spearphishing campaigns with an
industrial background is shown in figure 5. In phishing, un-
suspecting victims are sent emails with malicious content, of-
tentimes a link to a website that is infected with malware [57].
Attachments with malicious content are another common form
of phishing [57]. The chances of an attacker to get a victim to
follow the link can be increased by personalizing the email.
This is called “social engineering” [57], the application of
phishing to selected targets with highly adapted content is
called “spearphishing”.
Fig. 5. Timeline of Selected Spearphishing Campaigns
Operation Aurora [58] aimed at the software industry, par-
ticularly Google. The Night Dragon, Greek Oil and New Year’s
campaigns aimed at various branches of the energy industry,
namely research and petroleum processing [59]. Furthermore,
the Nitro campaign [60] aimed at the chemical industry and
was intended to obtain sensitive documents, designs and
schemas for manufacturing. Black Vine [61] campaign was
used for several targets. First, aerospace companies were in
the focus. After that, it was aimed against healthcare institu-
tions in the U.S. The Dragonfly [62] and Black Energy [63]
campaigns aimed at the energy industry as well, this time
against Industrial Control System (ICS) manufacturing and
power generation. In a report, an attack campaign, that is called
Unnamed [64] in our timeline in figure 5, was described also
aimed for the extraction of confidential information about ICS
manufacturing in the energy industry. Attacks on the industrial
infrastructure often aim at sabotaging production. Highly
sophisticated malware is employed in these campaigns [57].
A selected list of all known industrial malware campaigns can
be found in table II. In this table, the name of the malware
is shown, as well as the year of discovery. Furthermore, the
presumed target is listed, followed by a Target Score (TS)
describing the kind of attack that was employed. The TS is
assigned a value according to the following scheme:
• 1: The malware does not specifically target ICS, the
incurred consequences are a side effect
• 2: The malware targets Windows machines related to ICS
• 3: The malware targets software related to ICS projects
• 4: The malware targets PLCs and other native devices
and protocols
In addition to that, the presumed purpose, the affected ICS
and CVEs that were used in the exploit are listed. Slam-
mer and Conficker were computer worms that also infected
nuclear power station [65] respectively air force stations in
France and Germany [66]. Stuxnet [35] is one of the most
renowned industrial malwares. It was aimed at Iranian nuclear
enrichment facilities, but, due to programming errors, also
infected other systems and therefore was found. It used several
different 0-day exploits, depending on the operating systems it
encountered, and showed a deep understanding of Siemens S7-
300 PLCs. Duqu and Duqu 2.0 [67], [68] were used for spy-
ing on industrial project documents. Shamoon and Shamoon
2.0 [69] were intended on sabotaging the Saudi-Arabian oil
industry. Stuxnet 0.5 [70] was aimed at sabotaging Iranian
nuclear enrichment facilities, also by infecting Siemens S7-300
PLCs. It was employed before Stuxnet, but was found later
due to a different propagation mechanism. Havex [62] was
a malware infecting the European energy industry and spying
on confidential information. BlackEnergy and Industroyer [71]
were aimed at Ukrainian power plants. Major blackouts in
December of 2015, respectively December of 2016 in the
Ukraine are said to result from BlackEnergy and Industroyer.
VI. LESSONS LEARNED
We used Shodan [72], an internet search engine that spe-
cialises on the Internet of Things (IoT) and industrial ap-
plications. Specifically, we grouped our search by ports and
only looked for ports that are the default for several industrial
protocols. The results of this survey is shown in table III. It can
be seen that there still is a huge amount of industrial devices to
be found, directly connected to the internet. Since all of the en-
tries in table III are fieldbuses, their connection to the internet
is risky. They were never designed for security as one of the
paradigms in their development was the physical separation
of industrial network and internet [9]. This assumption does
not hold for about 1.45 million fieldbuses, that, depending on
their configuration, can be accessed - and probably tampered
with - by an attacker via internet access. We introduced some
concepts for botnets in our previous works [10], [11], and there
are other projects that develop industrial honeypots, such as the
Conpot [73]-project and the IoT-pot [74]. One could assume
that some of the entries in table III originate in honeypots.
We found that 137 of the above entries definitely stem from
honeypots by comparing the banners found with the default
banners of Conpot. Even though it is plausible that we missed
several honeypots, we deem it probable that a majority of
the entries is from productive systems. Despite the fact that
security flaws in industrial applications have been a critical
issue for quite some time, there still are devices and protocols
used in insecure ways.
TABLE II
A SELECTION OF ATTACK TOOLS AND CAMPAIGNS
Name Year Presumed Target TS Purp. Affected ICS Exploited CVE
Slammer 2003 untargeted 1 Sabot. Nuclear Power Station CVE-2002-0649
Conficker 2009 untargeted 1 Sabot. French & German Air Force CVE-2008-4250
Stuxnet 2010 Iranian Nuclear Enrichment Facilites 4 Sabot. Siemens S7-300 CVE-2010-2568
CVE-2008-4250
CVE-2010-2729
CVE-2010-2772
Duqu / Duqu 2.0 2011/2015 Industrial Project Documents 3 Esp. - -
Shamoon / Shamoon 2.0 2012/2017 Saudi-Arabian Oil Industry 2 Sabot. - -
Regin 2012 GSM Base Stations 4 Esp. - -
Stuxnet 0.5 2013 Iranian Nuclear Enrichment Facilites 4 Sabot. Siemens S7-300 CVE-2012-3015
Havex 2013 European Energy Industry 3 Esp. - -
BlackEnergy 2016 Ukrainian Power Plant 3 Sabot. - CVE-2014-4114
CVE-2014-0751
Industroyer 2017 Ukrainian Power Plant 4 Sabot. Siemens SIPROTEC CVE-2015-5374
TABLE III
DEVICES FOUND PUBLICLY ADDRESSABLE BY Shodan
Service Port Numbers Hits Hit Percentage
EtherNet/IP 2222 1 015 093 69.78%
DNP3 20000 232 108 15.95%
OMRON 9600 51 911 3.57%
Niagara Fox 1911 46 806 3.22%
ENIP 44818 32 100 2.21%
Proconos 20547 19 761 1.36%
Modbus 502 18 732 1.29%
CoDeSys 1200, 2455 17 667 1.21%
PCWorx 1962 14 949 1.03%
Siemens 102 3368 0.23%
Fieldbus 1089-1091 924 0.06%
Profinet 34962-34964 809 0.06%
DNP 19999 300 0.02%
EtherCAT 34980 270 0.02%
Sum - 1 454 798 100.00%
VII. CONCLUSION
The trend in figure 1 shows that PLC-exploitation is be-
coming more relevant. At the same time, our findings in
section VI point out that many operators do not employ
their industrial networks in a physically separated way to
at least provide basic security. In this work, we showed
that the kill chain for ICS is rather easy to use. There are
tools to identify vulnerable systems, as well as databases that
contain information about vulnerabilities and sometimes also
the corresponding exploits. This makes it simple also for non
tech-savvy people to attack systems and cause damage. The
rising importance of interconnectivity in industrial applications
will lead to an increase in interest of attackers. As more
and more industrial systems become accessible, get more
complex software and are remotely configurable, the number
of possibilities for exploitation and intrusion also increases.
Many industrial operators maintain their production units for
decades with little or no possibilities for software updates.
This leads to a tremendous danger, as more exploits occur
every year.
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